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PATENT TROLLING—WHY BIO & PHARMACEUTICALS 
ARE AT RISK 
 
Robin Feldman & W. Nicholson Price II
*
 
 
Patent trolls—also known variously as non-practicing entities, patent 
assertion entities, and patent monetizers—are a top priority on legislative 
and regulatory reform agendas.  In the modern debates, however, the 
biopharmaceutical industry goes conspicuously unmentioned.  Although 
biopharmaceuticals are paradigmatically centered on patents, conventional 
wisdom holds that biopharmaceuticals are largely unthreatened by trolls.  
This article shows that the conventional wisdom is wrong, both theoretically 
and descriptively. In particular, the article presents a ground-breaking study 
of the life science holdings of 5 major universities to determine if these 
might be attractive to monetizers.   
 
This was deliberately a light, rather than an exhaustive, search. 
Nevertheless, we identified dozens of patents that could be deployed against 
current industries. These include patents on active ingredients of drugs; 
methods of treatment; screening methods to identify new drugs; 
manufacturing methods; dosage forms; and ancillary technologies that 
could be deployed in a ―peddler‘s bag‖ approach. The article describes the 
types of patents we found, including an example of each type. 
 
In deciding whether to undertake this analysis, we lost sleep over 
whether the potential for harm outweighed the potential benefit. If reform 
efforts are not undertaken, our work could do no more than provide a handy 
road map for those who would follow. However, with scattered anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that monetization is moving into biopharmaceuticals, 
life sciences trolling is predictable and in its infancy. If reforms are 
implemented before the problem proliferates, legislators and regulators 
could cabin the activity before it becomes deeply entrenched and too much 
harm occurs. 
 
Word count: 16,729 words including footnotes. 
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PATENT TROLLING: WHY BIO & PHARMACEUTICALS ARE AT RISK 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Patent trolling is at the top of legislative and regulatory reform 
agendas at many levels. In May of 2013, for example, the White House 
released an extensive report on patent assertion, along with a series of 
executive orders and recommendations for Congress.
1
 Members of 
Congress were already showing interest in addressing the issue. A variety of 
bills have been introduced; the Chairmen of both the House and Senate 
Judiciary Committee have introduced bills on litigation reform, with 
hearings in the fall of 2013.
2
  In addition, subcommittees of the Senate 
Energy Committee and the House Energy & Commerce Committee have 
held hearings on pre-litigation reform. The proposals address different 
aspects of a complex problem that will need to be addressed on many levels 
across a long period of time. 
On the regulatory front, the Federal Trade Commission voted in 
September of 2013 to initiate a broad ranging Section 6(b) investigation into 
patent assertion entities. Under Section 6(b), the FTC has the power to 
conduct wide-ranging economic studies of businesses and practices that 
affect commerce.
3
 The FTC action followed a joint workshop held by the 
Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice in December of 
2012 on the antitrust implications of patent assertion entities.
4
 The Patent 
and Trademark Office has initiated its own proposals, focused largely on 
sunshine rules. The PTO activities follow its own workshop in January of 
                                                 
1
 Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation (June 2013), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf; White 
House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech 
Patent Issues (June 04, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues. 
2
 Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R. 845, 
113th Cong. (2013); End Anonymous Patents Act, H.R. 2024, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent 
Quality Improvement Act of 2013, S. 866, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Abuse Reduction 
Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Litigation and Innovation Act of 2013, 
H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (2013); Stopping the Offensive Use of Patents Act, H.R. 2766, 
113th Cong. (2013); Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Litigation 
Integrity Act of 2013, S. 1612, 113th Cong. (2013). 
3
 See generally OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, FTC, HISTORY OF SECTION 6 REPORT-
WRITING AT THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION(1981) [hereinafter HISTORY OF § 6], 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/econrpt/231984.pdf. 
4
 Press Release, Dep‘t. of Justice, Department of Justice, Federal Trade Commission to 
Hold Workship on Patent Assertion Entity Activites (Dec. 7, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2012/289873.htm. 
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2013, as well as the White House directives.
5
 
Some states have entered the fray as well. Vermont passed 
legislation related to patent trolling, and the Vermont Attorney General‘s 
Office has initiated actions against entities under that legislation.  Nebraska 
followed suit with its own actions, and other state legislatures are beginning 
to hold hearings.
6
 Even the Supreme Court has begun to nibble around the 
edges of the issue. The Court began the October 2013 term by granting 
certiorari in two cases that could have an impact on patent trolling, both 
related to awarding attorney‘s fees for baseless or exceptional patent cases 
that are rejected by the courts.
7
 
The issue has attracted increasing attention from academics, the 
press, and companies in many sectors. Technology companies have led the 
way, with active lobbying campaigns in the United States and in Europe as 
well.
8
 This is not surprising, given that modern patent trolling has made a 
strong appearance in technology heavy industries, such as software, 
                                                 
5
 Comments of the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice and 
the United States Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Notice of Roundtable on 
Proposed Requirements for Recordation of Real-Party-in-Interest Information Throughout 
Application Pendency and Patent Term, No. PTO-P-2012-0047 (Feb. 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/02/130201pto-rpi-comment.pdf; see supra note 3. 
6
 Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement Act 9 V.S.A. §§ 4195-99 (2013); 
Complaint, Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Inv., LLC, No. 2:13-cv-00170-wks (May 8, 2013); 
Letter from Jon Bruning, Attorney General, Nebraska, to M. Brett Johnson, Partner, Farney 
Daniels LLP (July 18, 2013) (demanding that law firm ―cease and desist the initiation of 
any and all new patent infringement enforcement efforts‖ with respect to patents held by its 
non-practicing-entity clients, pending a state investigation), available at 
http://www.ago.ne.gov/resources/dyn/files/1069534z3005a836/_fn/071813+Farney+Daniel
s+LLP+-+Cease+%26+Desist+Letter+and+Civil+Investigative+Demand.pdf; Press 
Release, Attorney General Lori Swanson Announces First-in-the-Nation Order to Stop 
Delaware Company from ―Patent Trolling‖ in Minnesota (August 20, 2013), available at 
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/Consumer/PressRelease/130820StopPatentTrolling.asp; Press 
Release, Coakley Discusses Patent Trolling During Tour of Boston Startup LevelUp (Nov. 
6, 2013), available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-
releases/2013/2013-11-06-patent-trolling.html; Informational Hearing on Patent Assertion 
Entities Before the California Assembly Select Committee on High Technology (October 
30, 2013) (statement of Prof. Brian J. Love), http://law.scu.edu/wp-content/uploads/Brian-
Love-Testimony-Cal-Select-Comm-on-High-Tech-Hearing-on-PAEs-10-30-13.pdf. 
7
 Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 Fed. Appx. 57 (Fed. Cir. 
2013), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3146 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013) (No. 12-1184); 
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Sys., 687 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012), 
cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013) (No. 12-1163). 
8
 Letter from adidas, AG, et al. to Member States of the European Union, et al. (Sept. 
26, 2013), available at 
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BwxyRPFduTN2NkpoN29UVm11OWc; Letter from the 
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, et al. to Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, 
et al. (July 17, 2013). 
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smartphones, and computers. Retail companies have joined in as well, 
however, with brick and mortar stores like J.C. Penny Co. and adidas AG 
asking lawmakers to provide relief, and fighting back in the courts.
9
 
In all of the noise, however, the life sciences industry has been 
silent. Conventional wisdom holds that patent trolling is a problem for the 
technology sector, not for biotechnology and pharmaceuticals.  Indeed, in 
the debate leading up to the 2011 patent reform legislation known as the 
America Invents Act, the life sciences industry opposed reforms to patent 
damage calculations, reforms that might have helped curb some of the 
patent trolling activity that has exploded in the interim. Thus, any 
legislation or regulatory reforms that emerge are likely to be designed to 
bypass the life sciences industry. 
We believe that the conventional wisdom is shortsighted. These 
industries are far more vulnerable to trolling than commonly acknowledged, 
and there are early indications that patent trolling is beginning to move into 
the life sciences arena. In a sign of things to come, for example, patent 
brokers are beginning to hear from pharmaceutical companies who are 
looking for monetizers that might be interested in buying their non-core 
patents.
10
 Similarly, two recent studies on patent demands against startup 
companies showed patent demands moving into the life sciences industry.
11
   
                                                 
9
 Abusive Patent Litigation: The Impact on American Innovation and Jobs, and 
Potential Solutions, Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property & the Internet of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 9–112, 136–45, 236–60 (Mark Chandler, 
Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Cisco Systems; Janet L. Dhillon, Evexutive 
Vice President and General Counsel of J.C. Penny Co.; John G. Boswell, Senior Vice 
President and Chief Legal Officer of SAS Institute; and Dana Rao, Vice President and 
Associate General Counsel of Adobe Systems testifying before the House Committee on 
the need for patent reform in response to abusive patent litigation). 
10
 Lisa Shuchman, The AIA’s Impact on In-House Patent Processes, Corporate 
Counsel (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202641886062 (noting that 
intellectual property counsel in the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical devices 
industries ―are being called upon to monetize and get more value out of their company‘s 
IP.‖) 
11
 Robin Feldman, PATENT DEMANDS & STARTUP COMPANIES: THE VIEW FROM THE 
VENTURE CAPITAL COMMUNITY 2, 36 (2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346338 (finding that 30% of venture 
capitalists in sample who have received patent demands have experienced them in the life 
sciences sector); Colleen Chien, PATENT ASSERTION AND STARTUP INNOVATION 11 fig. 1 
(2013), 
http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Patent%20Assertion%20
and%20Startup%20Innovation_updated.pdf (finding that 13% of bio/pharma or medical 
device venture capitalists in the sample reported receiving NPE demands against their 
portfolio companies).  See also Jonathan Harris, Diane Ragosa, and Thara Russell, When 
NPEs Target the Medical Device Industry, Corporate Counsel (Feb. 4, 2014), 
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202641437461 (noting the growth of monetizer activity 
in the medical devices industry and their relatively high success rate against that industry). 
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Most important, as patent monetizers move towards purchasing 
portfolios from research universities, the risk to biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies that have existing products on the market 
increases exponentially. There is increasing pressure on universities to 
monetize their patents by transferring rights to assertion entities. In 
particular, the Association of University Technology Managers recently 
announced that it was re-examining its policies that had recommended 
against transferring rights to non-practicing entities.
12
 Most important, some 
of the proposals would exempt universities and those working with 
universities from the reforms that are intended to curb abuses in patent 
monetization. It is critical for legislative drafters to understand the potential 
for problems within university portfolios in general and life science 
portfolios in particular. Without such recognition, patent monetization 
entities may be able to form joint ventures with universities or obtain 
sufficient exclusive licensing rights to university portfolios that would allow 
them to avoid any reforms enacted.
13
 
Our goal in this article is to sound the alarm and to demonstrate the 
importance of taking action before the problem proliferates. In order to do 
this, we examined the patent portfolios of the 5 research universities that 
hold the largest number of patents. Following approaches taken by different 
types of monetizers in the technology field, we identified university patents 
that could be launched against types of products currently sold by 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies. This article describes a 
selection of those patents in order to demonstrate the risks that exist. 
In deciding whether to undertake this analysis, we lost sleep over the 
question of whether the potential for harm from engaging in the analysis 
outweighed the potential benefit. As one of the authors has noted in the 
                                                 
12
 See Paul Baskin, Under Financial Pressure, Universities Give Patent Buyers a 
Closer Look, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Oct 25, 2013); see also Heidi Ledford, 
Universities Struggle to Make Patents Pay, NATURE (September 24, 2013) (documenting 
examples of federally funded university patents that have been transferred to patent 
monetization entities). 
13
 The Impact of Patent Assertion Entities on Innovation and the Economy Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 113th 
Congress (2013), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/hearing/impact-patent-
assertion-entities-innovation-and-economy (statement of Robin Feldman, Director of 
Institute for Innovation Law at the University of California Hastings College of the Law, 
that leaving out universities and associated joint ventures could potentially create a 
loophole, if such provisions are not carefully framed to avoid gaming by NPEs, in response 
to inquiry by Congressman Ben Lujan); see also Saving High-Tech Innovators from 
Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2013) (creating conditions 
to bring a patent infringement claim, among them that the party alleging infringement be: 
the original inventor, a university or technology transfer office, or have made substantial 
investment in the production or sale of an item covered by the patent.  
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past, if reform efforts are not undertaken, our work could do no more than 
provide a handy road map for those who would follow. Despite those 
concerns, however, we believe this is an important moment in the evolution 
of patent trolling. Technology trolling seeped in silently under the radar, 
growing to extraordinary dimensions before lawmakers had time to react. In 
contrast, life sciences trolling is predictable and in its infancy. If reforms are 
implemented before the problem proliferates throughout the industry, 
legislators and regulators have a chance to cabin the activity before it 
becomes deeply entrenched and before too much harm occurs.  
  
PART I. WHAT IS PATENT TROLLING? 
 
 Patent assertion, and the strategic game-playing associated with it, is 
not new. Scholars have noted that the assertion of patents by those who do 
not use the patents themselves can be found scattered throughout the history 
of the US patent system.
14
 Similarly, agents who brokered sales of patents 
can be found as well, with such brokers earning the title of ―patent sharks‖ 
in the 19
th
 Century.
15
 
 In recent years, however, the market for patent trading and patent 
assertion has expanded dramatically, reaching an extraordinary scope and 
level of sophistication. Studies show that the percentage of patent litigation 
by those who do not make products has increased from roughly 25% in 
2007 to almost 60% in 2012.
16
  In other words, as of 2012, the majority of 
litigation is filed by those whose core business involves asserting patents, 
rather than making products. This, of course, is only the tip of the iceberg. 
                                                 
14
 Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of 
Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1809 (2007) (―[A]mong a host of dormant 
patents, some will be found which contain some new principle … which the inventor, 
however, had failed to render of any use in his own invention. And some other inventor, 
ignorant that such a principle had been discovered … had the genius to render it of great 
practical value … when, lo! The patent-sharks among the legal profession, always on the 
watch for such cases, go to the first patentee and, for a song, procure an assignment of his 
useless patent, and at once proceed to levy black-mail upon the inventor of the valuable 
patent.‖) (quoting Sen. Isaac Christiancy, 8 Cong. Reg. 307 (1878)). 
15
 See Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Kenneth L. Sokoloff, and Dhanoos Sutthiphisal, Patent 
Alchemy: The Market for Technology in US History, 87 BUS. HIST. REV. 3, 21 (2013) 
(documenting attorneys who served as patent brokers in the nineteenth century). 
16
 See Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: Effects of 
Patent Monetization Entities (forthcoming UCLA JOURNAL OF L. & TECH.  2014); see also 
Colleen V. Chien, Patent Assertion Entities, Presentation to the DOJ/FTC 
hearing on PAEs, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (December 10, 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314 (using data from 
RPX corporation and concluding that the percentage of litigation by non-
practicing entities in 2012 has reached 62%). 
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Estimates suggest that 90% of patent demands never proceed to litigation, 
either because the target ignores the demand or because the target pays the 
demand to avoid the costs and risks of litigation, regardless of the merit of 
the claim.
17
 
 Complexity breeds opportunity, and the patent system is nothing if 
not complex. In fact, one of the authors has argued that patents themselves 
are best understood as an opportunity to bargain, rather than as a form of 
clear, definitive rights. It is tremendously difficult to know what the 
language of a patent covers, and it can cost as much as one to six million 
dollars to find out through a patent lawsuit.
18
 Moreover, if a product 
company challenges a patent and loses, in addition to the litigation costs, 
the company could be facing enormous damages, and even the possibility 
that its product could be shut down entirely. These are heady risks, and ones 
that rational companies might choose to avoid.  The risks are not just the 
quantifiable costs of lawyers and experts. Recent academic work also 
documents the less tangible costs such as distraction to management, 
difficulty obtaining investors, and the need to retool the product. 
 Two other key issues in modern patent law have helped facilitate the 
rise of modern patent trolling. For some time, many of the most 
sophisticated players in the patent games, and many of those who owned 
large patent portfolios, were product companies. If a product company 
launched its patents against someone else, the target company would just 
launch its own set of patents in return, putting the original company‘s 
                                                 
17
 According to figures in a 2013 White House report on patent assertion & U.S. 
innovation, conservative estimates place the number of patent demand threats in 2011 at a 
minimum of 60,000 and more likely at over 100,000.  EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION & U.S. INNOVATION 6 (2013). Approximately 3,500 patent 
infringement lawsuits were filed in 2011. See Feldman, Ewing, Jeruss, America Invents Act 
500 Expanded: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, (forthcoming UCLA J.L. & TECH. 
2014).  Thus, just 3.50% to 5.83% of patent demands develop into patent litigation.  See 
also Colleen V. Chien, Patent Assertion Entities, Presentation to the Dec 10, 2012 
DOJ/FTC Hearing on PAEs at 23–27 (2012), SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK 
(December 10, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314 
(citing In re Innovatio Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 907 (N.D. Ill. 
2013) (noting that Innovatio had sent over 8,000 demand letters but brought only a few 
dozen suits)). 
18
 Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations 
and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 34, 63 (2012); Tom Ewing, Practical 
Considerations in the Indirect Deployment of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations 
and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 109, 119, 131 
(2012); see also American Intellectual Property Association, 2011 Report of the 
Economic Survey (2011) (For a patent infringement claim that could be worth less than a 
$1 million, median legal costs are $650,000.  When $1 million to $25 million is considered 
at risk, total litigation costs can hit $2.5 million.  For a claim over $25 million, median 
legal costs are $5 million.). 
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products at risk. Thus, a form of mutually assured destruction and common 
risk aversion acted as a natural break on patent demands. In the new market 
for patent monetization, monetizers do not make products and may be 
organized to hold few assets. Thus, they are free to initiate a patent attack, 
knowing that there is little to launch in return.   
Modern patent assertion begins by exploiting the high costs and 
risks of patent litigation. Offer a settlement comfortably below the point of 
cost and risk, and a rational company may choose to settle.  The techniques 
can be even more effective with a group of patents. Suppose I claim that 
your smartphone infringes my patent on gumballs.  That may seem pretty 
far-fetched to you, and you may be unlikely to settle. Suppose, however, I 
threaten to throw a hundred patents at you as well. The simple process of 
determining whether any of the patents might have a valid claim against 
your product is costly, let alone the costs and risks of litigating the entire 
lot. Under these circumstances, a rational company might choose to settle, 
regardless of the merits of the claims. I think of these as peddler‘s bag 
monetizers. 
In a variant on that theme, some monetizers try to assert their patents 
widely against large numbers of targets, asking for moderate settlement 
amounts, and hoping to reap a healthy profit in the aggregate. I think of this 
as an assault rifle approach, aiming rapid fire at a wide number of targets at 
the same time.  
Some of the assault rifle trolls have begun to target the end users of 
products, rather than those who make products themselves. For example, 
coffee shops and hotels have received demand letters from monetizers, 
asking for payment for the fact their locations have wifi installed, which 
allegedly infringes a patent the monetizer holds related to wifi equipment. 
Similarly, small businesses have received demand letters asking for 
payment based on their use of office equipment such as scanning to a fax 
machine. Information and resource asymmetries make this type of 
monetization particularly troubling. Small mom-and-pop stores are unlikely 
to have the resources and experience with patenting to even be able to 
investigate the validity of the claim. While larger end users, such as hotels, 
may have more resources, they are likely to lack experience with the 
technology asserted in a way that would allow them to easily evaluate the 
merits. 
Targeting really large end users can have the effect of vastly 
increasing a monetizer‘s returns, given the way that damages are calculated. 
For example, suppose I hold a patent that I want to assert against those who 
make software related to tracking bank customers. If I sue the software 
company, my damages may be calculated as a percentage of the software 
sales, for example, fifty million dollars. If I sue each of the banks‘ 
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customers, however, I may be able to get damages calculated on the base of 
sales for all of the combined business of the banks, which could be five 
hundred million. Although in theory, damages should be rationalized to the 
actual value contributed by the patent, in reality, damages can be based 
more loosely on the percentages of products and revenue.
19
 This multiplies 
the risk and the settlement value when dealing with large end users.  
In contrast, some patent monetizers operate along the lines of what 
one scholar has described as ―lottery ticket trolls.‖20 Less interested in large 
indiscriminate portfolios and quick settlements, they are interested in higher 
value patents that can bring larger settlements from blockbuster companies.  
This approach, as well as other modern monetization approaches, is aided 
by the proliferation of software and business method patents. Problems with 
this type of patent are discussed in detail in Rethinking Patent Law, but a 
brief explanation is the following. As computer related inventions 
proliferated in the 1970s and 1980s, inventors tried to find ways that the 
PTO and the courts would accept that these inventions were patentable. 
Early Supreme Court forays suggested that the key to patentability lay in 
avoiding anything that looked like math or formulas. Rather, one should 
describe the invention in simple industrial terms.  Thus, we have settled into 
a system in which software and business method patents simply name in 
abstract terms what the invention does, without specifying how the inventor 
actually accomplished it.
21
 For example, the goal in Diehr was curing 
rubber;
22
 the goal in Flook was operating hydrocarbon machinery;
23
 the 
goal in LabCorp was treating patients with vitamin B12 and folic-acid 
                                                 
19
 See Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for 
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1702 (2010) (―The likely 
scenario in such a case is then this: A jury, when presented with portfolio licensing 
exemplars under which royalties may be as high as 5-8% of the licensee's revenues, will 
combine these high rates with evidence showing total sales of a successful, complex 
product and reach a conclusion on damages that bears no reasonable relationship to the 
value of an individual patented component.‖); see also ClearValue, Inc. v. Pearl River 
Polymers, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 560, 577 (E.D. Tex. 2010) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 668 
F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 
F.2d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (―[T]he factual determination of a reasonable royalty . . . 
need not be supported, and indeed, frequently is not supported by the specific figures 
advanced by either party.‖).  
20
 Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1010 (2013). 
21
 See Robin Feldman, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 111–13, 130–35 (2012).  Mark 
Lemley refers to this as ―functional claiming.‖  Mark Lemley, Software Patents and the 
Return of Functional Claiming 7 (Stanford Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 2117302, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2117302. 
22
 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981). 
23
 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586, (1978). 
10 PATENT TROLLING   
deficiencies.
24
 Framing in that manner does not provide much in the way of 
a dividing line for separating what is patentable from what is unpatentable.
 
25
 
Patents such as these have an extraordinary reach into many types of 
inventions, particularly if they are drafted broadly. They can wreak havoc 
when later asserted in the market place after companies have already 
developed products. 
Yet another version of patent monetization involves product 
companies themselves. As monetization has taken off, many product 
companies have begun spinning off non-core assets to monetizers, who then 
assert those patents against other product companies.  The activity can be a 
rational form of asset management. However, it can also be a more 
troubling behavior known as privateering.
26
 With privateering, a product 
company transfers assets to a monetizer in an attempt to raise its rivals‘ 
costs of operation, thereby damaging them as a competitior. In other words, 
as a product company, if I launch patents at my competitor, the competitor 
is likely to counter-sue, putting my own projects at risk. It I transfer the 
patents to a third-party monetizer with no products, keeping a license for 
myself, that monetizer can launch against my competitors, and I am safe.  If 
the transfer agreement is structured so that I receive a return on the 
monetizer‘s assertion campaign, I can raise my rival‘s costs and directly 
profit from the activity, all from a safe distance. 
Even more complex and sophisticated variations on these themes 
have emerged.  For example, suppose a product company has a group of 
patents related to a particular technology. Rather than transferring the group 
of patents to one monetizer, the company divides the patents up among ten 
monetizers. I refer to this tactic as disaggregation. With disaggregation, the 
company can multiply the returns from the group of patents, as well as 
multiplying any damage to a competitor. 
Many of these patents were never intended to directly earn a profit. 
The companies developed them as a method of protecting the operating 
space around their core technology. Now, however, those patents are being 
stripped off, repurposed and launched in ways that can multiply their 
damage in the marketplace. 
This echoes the more general problem with modern monetization. 
The patent office has very little time to spend reviewing any individual 
                                                 
24
 Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004). 
25
 See Robin Feldman, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 111–13, 130–35.  
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patent.
27
 Estimates suggest that the patent office may spend only 18 hours 
spread over a period of two years on a patent application.
28
 Thus, individual 
patents, and individual claims within each patent, may be problematic.
29
 For 
some time, this posed little difficulty. The vast majority of patents never 
earned any direct return, and society could take comfort in the fact that 
important patents would have their claims tested in court. Now that patents 
are being traded as commodities and grouped for new purposes, the sheer 
volume of active patents of uncertain value and scope is straining the patent 
system.
30
 
With any invention, the ability to scale and mass produce opens new 
possibilities for market expansion and proliferation. Patent monetization is 
no different. The sheer amount of patent demand activity is staggering, as is 
the variety of models and approaches. The impact on companies is dramatic 
as well. Although difficult to measure with any accuracy, scholars have 
estimated that patent demands are costing US companies over twenty 
billion dollars a year.
31
 
In theory, a market for patent monetization could be a positive force. 
A market that matched inventors with those who could translate the 
inventions into a saleable product would provide a benefit for society 
consistent with goals of the patent system. The market for modern market 
for patent monetization, however, is not playing out in that manner. There 
are almost no new products emerging from this extraordinary amount of 
money changing hands. Rather, patent monetization seems to be operating 
primarily as a tax on current products. Worse yet, studies suggest that much 
of the money changing hands never makes it to inventors but is absorbed by 
the monetizers themselves.
32
 Thus, in economic terms, the patent 
monetization system is operating as a tremendously leaky bucket, one that 
appears to be harming consumers and innovation.  
                                                 
27
 Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 250, 264 
(2013). 
28
 Id. 
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30
 Id. at 265 (―The modern combination of Magnification and monetization is playing 
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31
 James Bessen, Jennifer Ford, & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of 
Patent Trolls, 34:4 REGULATION 26 (Winter 2011–2012). 
32
 James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 
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 As concerns have escalated over the problem of patent trolling, 
everyone has scrambled to define terms. In this highly charged atmosphere, 
no one wants to be branded a bad guy, and if patent trolls are bad guys, 
everyone wants the definition to point somewhere else. And, indeed, 
numerous definitions—and variations on those definitions—have been 
offered to define the notion of patent trolling. Many use the term non-
practicing entity, or NPE, in reference to entities that do not use the patents 
they own to create anything. In the code-like language of patents, using the 
ideas in the patent to create a product is called ―practicing the patent,‖ and 
thus, those who do not create products are called ―non-practicing.‖ Among 
many others, Congress has used the term NPE in directing the non-partisan 
General Accounting Office to study the topic.
33
  
Problems with the term include the question of whether to include 
universities in the definition. Universities are in the business of scientific 
research and education, and they generally do not engage in the production 
of products from their inventions.
34
 Thus, they do not actually practice the 
ideas in their patent portfolios. In addition, a term that references only 
entities is also problematic. Some of the most famous modern examples of 
those who do not practice the ideas in their patents, but use the patents to 
demand license fees from others, are individuals.
35
  
One of us has argued elsewhere that the key definitional question is 
not the identity of the acting entity—corporation, individual, university, or 
                                                 
33
  See Pub.L. No. 112-29 § 34 (2011) (directing the nonpartisan General 
Accounting Office to study the consequences of litigation by non-practicing  
entities); see also 157 CONG. REC. S5441 (daily ed. September 8, 2011) 
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35
 See, e.g., Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 Seton Hall L. Rev. 457, 470 
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Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate America, NEW YORK TIMES (JULY 13, 2013) 
(profiling Erich Spangenberg), available at 
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otherwise—but the activity engaged in.36  We define the relevant activity 
broadly, to include not only litigating patents but also engaging in patent-
based demands, which is likely to have similar economic effects on 
industry, if not on the judicial system.
37
  We also think that including only 
those who purchase and then assert patents narrows the relevant activity too 
far; practicing firms which generate patents not intended for 
commercialization may assert them themselves, spin off sub-entities to 
assert their patents, or license them for assertion.
38
  Similarly, classical 
patent assertion entities could get into the business of filing patents not 
intended for commercialization to avoid any fixed definition relying on 
patent purchase.
39
  However, these are complex issues, and need not be 
fully resolved here.  To address the questions at hand broadly, we will use 
the term ―monetizers‖ as one of us has previously proposed, which includes 
all entities and individuals ―whose core business involves licensing and 
litigating patents, rather than making products.‖40 
 
PART II. CONVENTIONAL WISDOM AND THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE 
 
 The variety and complexity of the players, and the range of behavior 
involved, in the market for patent monetization makes the issue difficult to 
tackle. Moreover, innovation is never an easy issue to predict or incentivize, 
and it remains the driving force of the US economy. The challenge is 
finding ways to deter abusive behavior without inadvertently harming 
innovation. 
 Despite the challenges, legislators and regulators at both the state 
and federal level are working on proposals to mitigate problems from patent 
monetization.
41
 The discussion has centered largely on issues related to 
technology, however, with biotech and pharmaceuticals on the sidelines. 
 This is not surprising. Conventional wisdom holds that patent 
monetization is a problem for high-technology, but not for biotechnology or 
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pharmaceuticals, and that any solutions must be designed to avoid 
impacting bio and pharma. The section below describes the conventional 
thinking, and explores its weaknesses. 
 
A.  Never the Twain Shall Meet
42
 
 
A cost comparison between the bio/ pharmaceutical and high-tech 
industries reveals a stark contrast in both spending levels and business 
philosophy.  Drug companies spend large sums on research and 
development, often facing daunting failure rates. In contrast, the technology 
industry seems to reward those companies that spend less on research and 
development, a trend that has encourage a proliferation of low-end software 
markets that lower the barrier to entry for smaller companies. 
For example, pharmaceutical industry statistics suggest that the 
average cost of developing a successful new drug in 2007 fell between $800 
million and $1 billion,
43
 and the cost has risen to $1.3 billion in 2012.
44
  
Outside studies using drug industry data suggest that the figure has grown 
even higher in 2013.
45
 Although scholars have disputed the derivation of 
these figures,
 46
 it is clear that drug development is not for the faint of heart.  
 A significant factor in these skyrocketing costs is the impact of the 
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expenses that follow the development of a drug once it has been discovered.  
For example, clinical trials for high-profile drugs can cost as much as $100 
million alone.
47
  Indeed, for some drugs the ―combined cost of 
manufacturing and clinical testing [alone] . . .  has added up to $1 billion.‖  
Further adding to R&D expenses is the fact that certain costs continue to 
add up even after a drug hits the market.
48
  For example, companies 
customarily monitor reports of a successful drug‘s side effects to ensure 
safety, an endeavor that requires massive amounts of manpower and 
organization.
49
  Johnson & Johnson‘s safety infrastructure alone employs 
nearly 1,000 people, an infrastructure that the company‘s Co-Chairman of 
Pharmaceuticals Paul Stoffels has noted is enough people to form an entire 
biotech company.
50
 
Drug companies also cite the unavoidably high failure rate of drug 
research as a key factor in the high Research & Development costs.  
According to a recent industry publication, ―[f]or every 5,000-10,000 
compounds that enter the research and development . . . pipeline, ultimately 
only one receives approval.‖51  An August 2013 Forbes study concluded 
that 19 out of every 20 drugs being developed ultimately fails, a 95 percent 
failure rate.
52
  All of these factors combine to make drug development an 
expensive and risky endeavor.  
To compare costs between the biotech/pharmaceutical industry and 
the technology industry – particularly its most successful players – is to 
compare two fundamentally different strategies on R&D spending. Success 
in the technology industry has come to those who target their R&D 
sparingly toward the creation of new markets.  
Indeed, most studies of the technology industry have shown that 
technology companies cannot spend their way toward success.  For 
example, in 2011, software giant Microsoft pumped more than any other 
company in the technology industry into R&D, at $9.0 billion (just behind 
Pfizer, holding steady at $9.1 billion) or 12.9 percent of its sales.
53
  The 
results of these expenditures, however, were primarily evolutionary 
upgrades to its existing Windows operating system and Office software, 
updates that were seen as largely incremental.
54
  During this period, the 
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company‘s attempts to reestablish its former dominance in mobile phones 
have been largely unsuccessful, and outgoing CEO Steve Ballmer has 
admitted that his company now has ―almost no share‖ in that market.55 
The opposite has been true for Microsoft‘s rival, Apple. With a net 
income of $41.7 billion in 2012, Apple remains not only the most profitable 
technology company in the U.S. but also the second-most profitable 
company in the world, behind Exxon.
56
  Despite its dramatic success, Apple 
spends significantly less on R&D than its competitors.  In 2012, Apple 
spent $3.4 billion on R&D, only 2 percent of its sales –  a percentage that 
remained the same as in 2011.
57
  Indeed, the company has stated that this 
level of targeted spending is a key element of its business strategy: ―[Apple] 
continues to believe that focused investments in R&D are critical to its 
future growth and competitive position in the marketplace.‖58  
Apple‘s success in the iPhone and iPad products, and its policies 
regarding compatible products, has helped spark a revolution in the 
software industry. Indeed, the application economy that has arisen as a 
result of consumers‘ demand for mobile applications has facilitated the 
development of the lower end of the software industry.  Barriers to entry are 
low enough that it is easier and cheaper than ever for small companies to 
enter the market and create apps without substantial investment.  In a recent 
report, the Government Accountability Office offered a passing anecdote 
that exemplifies this newfound ease of market entry and development: 
―[R]epresentatives from one small software company we spoke with said 
that they could develop a product in a little as 2 months with only a few 
programmers.‖59  
Within platform ecosystems like Apple‘s, established technology 
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companies actively encourage other companies to create products that build 
upon their own innovations, an inherently interdependent business model 
that makes it a lot easier to enter the industry. For example, the company 
makes it easier for software developers to create iPhone applications by 
giving them free access to the iPhone‘s underlying technology through its 
developer tools.
60
  This makes it much simpler for a developer to implement 
certain basic features found in all mobile apps that most users take for 
granted, such as the ability to have animated buttons that react to the user‘s 
touch.
61
  A startup company looking to create the next great iPhone 
application does not have to expend nearly as much time or energy creating 
the underlying technologies needed for their app to function properly as 
they would otherwise have to.  Smaller developers that would not otherwise 
have the resources to enter the software development market can now do so.  
Platform-steward companies such as Apple also provide the 
underlying infrastructure for delivering applications and transacting 
payments for those applications on their respective app stores.
62
  Thus, 
smaller developers, since they can offer their products to consumers through 
a sales portal built into each device – a feature that makes the devices 
themselves more compelling as well.  
Overall, the rise of the application economy and the degree to which 
it has facilitated the proliferation of small software businesses is indicative 
of a broader trend in the technology industry toward lower costs and easy 
access.  This stands in sharp contrast to R&D-heavy industries like 
pharmaceuticals, in which smaller companies cannot easily enter the market 
because each player must shoulder heavy development costs. In other 
words, you cannot do biotech in your garage, but you can certainly write a 
software application—or even found a computer company.63 
 The costs of entry and the structure of the industry affect 
conventional wisdom about the industry‘s relative safety from patent 
trolling. The long lead time and extensive financial investment necessary 
for a bio/pharmaceutical product creates the sense that all relevant patents 
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will have emerged. As one commentator noted, ―Before biotech companies 
decide to go into the market, they might be more cognizant or concerned 
about whether they have time to operate, because they‘re going to invest a 
lot of time and money to get there. . . . biotech takes so long to get into any 
commercial embodiment that people know about the patent to begin 
with.‖64 
 Similarly, the difficulty of entering the bio/pharmaceutical product 
market suggests that there will be fewer patents floating around that 
monetizers can acquire and fewer targets for them to go after.  ―It‘s a 
different life cycle between the patents and technology development. It 
reduces the number of targets for infringement because [the 
commercialization pathway] reduces the number of people who are going to 
get on the market.‖65 With fewer possible patents and fewer targets, trolling 
in the bio/pharmaceutical industry could be less lucrative on the whole.  
 The numbers limitation also applies to the products themselves. 
Technology products tend to have multiple components. This makes it more 
likely that a patent monetizer can find a patent that relates to some part of 
the product somehow. The method by which courts assess patent 
infringement damages also makes multiple component products a more 
appealing target. Under some damages approaches, a small component can 
command a large share of the revenue, leading to greater leveraging power 
when demanding a license.
66
 As one scholar noted, monetizers are less 
troublesome in the pharmaceutical sector because pharmaceutical products 
have one patent for one arduously researched chemical.
67
 
 The type of patents in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
industries also reduce the appeal of monetization in comparison to patents 
in high technology. Technology patents tend to be broader, particularly in 
the software arena. As described above, in an attempt to avoid being labeled 
as an unpatentable mathematical formula, software patents are drafted in 
prose language that describes what the software does, rather than how the 
inventor accomplished it.
68
 This leads to the happy coincidence of broad 
patents with unclear boundaries and a remarkably wide potential reach. In 
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contrast, patents in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical space are more 
limited, hewing somewhat better to the more traditional restriction that a 
patent should describe not just the idea but how to implement the idea. 
Once again, broad patents have a wider reach and provide better weapons to 
launch in a monetization campaign—which suggests that monetizers will 
choose to populate the technology industry, rather than biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals. 
 Finally, biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies have been 
less concerned about patent trolling because it they have yet to experience 
it—at least not to the extent of the technology industry. Early studies 
suggested that patent trolling activity was largely concentrated in the 
technology sector, rather than biotechnology and pharmaceuticals.
69
 The 
relative lack of patent trolling activity in the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical sectors leads to the sense that, ―if it is not on my doorstep, I 
have nothing to fear.‖ 
 
B.  Fallacies in the Conventional Wisdom 
 
 There is much truth to the conventional wisdom. Biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical research does involve a greater investment of time, money 
and expertise. This results in fewer patents, fewer targets, and a longer lead 
time for problems to emerge. In addition, developments in product type and 
patent rules affect the opportunities for patent demands. Biotech and 
pharmaceutical products tend to have fewer components, and patents in the 
field tend to be less broad than the software and business method patents 
that proliferate in the technology industry.   
However, the conventional wisdom suffers from three weaknesses.  
First, it ignores the role that regulation plays in making some 
pharmaceutical patents harder to invent around, thus raising the potential 
hold-up costs of what patents are available to monetize.  Second, it assumes 
a classical model of patent bargaining, rather than the strategic bargaining 
and suit filing adopted by modern monetizers.  Third, it assumes that 
monetizers will confine themselves to a relatively narrow set of 
technological targets; while high-tech may be low-hanging fruit, the 
proliferation and increasing sophistication of monetizers means that other 
industries are likely to be targeted in the near future. 
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1. Regulatory barriers to inventing around in biopharmaceuticals70  
 
Conventional wisdom ignores the ways that regulatory barriers 
make patent holdup particularly costly in biopharmaceuticals by increasing 
the cost of ―inventing around.‖  The idea of inventing around is simple: if 
someone holds a patent on one aspect of a product, someone wishing to 
make that product must either a) license the patent or b) change the product 
or production method to avoid using the patented technology.  The second 
path is the process of ―inventing around.‖71 
In the context of patent litigation or negotiations, the costs of 
inventing around the patent are a crucial factor.  Setting aside damages and 
litigation costs—which may be significant—the hold-up value of a potential 
injunction depends on the difficulty of inventing around.  The manufacturer 
has an expectation of profits based on the status quo; a monetizer (or a 
competitor) who can assert a blocking patent should be able to extract no 
more than the value of keeping the status quo over shifting to another aspect 
of production—that is, inventing around the blocked technology and 
implementing that invention.  If the costs of inventing around are very low 
(for example, switching one off-the-shelf for another off-the-shelf part), the 
value of avoiding the injunction may be very low.  If the costs are very high 
(for example, if the technology covers a key technology to the product), the 
value of avoiding the injunction is correspondingly high.  For example, 
RIM was willing to settle for $612.5 million when the alternative was an 
injunction preventing it from using the central technology in its BlackBerry 
communications devices.
72
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.‖); Islah Ahmed et al., Follow-On Biologics: Impact of Biologic Product Life Cycle and 
European Experience on the Regulatory Trajectory in the United States, 34 CLINICAL 
THERAPEUTICS 400, 400–19 (2012) (―In theory you can develop technology sensitive 
enough to establish clinically relevant thresholds of heterogeneity such that Hatch-Waxman 
type structure could be applied. In practice, this is extremely challenging because it is 
difficult to establish a correlation between biophysical differences and clinical effects.‖). 
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 See generally Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 
1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (―[T]he incentive to innovation that flows from ‗inventing around‘ 
an adversely held patent must be preserved.‖); London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 
F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (―Although designing or inventing around patents to 
make new inventions is encouraged, piracy is not. Thus, where an infringer, instead of 
inventing around a patent by making a substantial change, merely makes an insubstantial 
change, essentially misappropriating or even ‗stealing‘ the patented invention, infringement 
may lie under the doctrine of equivalents.‖). 
72
 See Rob Kelley, BlackBerry maker, NTP ink $612 million settlement, CNN Money 
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The FDA‘s regulatory apparatus strengthens many patents in the 
biopharmaceutical industry by adding regulatory barriers to the 
technological and marketing costs of inventing around a blocked 
technology.
73
  In the strongest case, it is essentially impossible to invent 
around a composition-of-matter patent covering the active pharmaceutical 
ingredient of a drug, because changing the active pharmaceutical ingredient 
of a drug necessarily changes the drug itself and generally requires an 
entirely new FDA approval process, including new clinical trials.
74
  Such a 
patent would therefore provide a very strong blocking patent.  Accordingly, 
a patent monetizer holding a previously unknown but valid patent covering 
a drug‘s active pharmaceutical ingredient could potentially extract a large 
portion of the value of the drug. 
FDA approval processes provide similar—though less drastic—
regulatory barriers to inventing around patents on methods of 
manufacturing drugs,
75
 particular dosage forms, or methods of treatment.  
Firms can still potentially invent around such patents, but the costs of doing 
so are significantly increased by regulatory costs associated with such 
changes. 
 
2. The assumption of classical patent bargaining and suits 
 
 The conventional wisdom is also premised on a model of patent 
bargaining in which the value and relevance of each patent in relation to a 
potential infringing product is carefully weighed, the spurious demands 
drop out, and the more meritorious claims advance to a court for 
determination. It is a world in which the relevant players are evident, and a 
certain level of discipline is imposed by the fear that one‘s target could 
launch its own patent stockpile back at you, threatening your own products.  
                                                                                                                            
(March 3, 2006, 7:29 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/03/technology/rimm_ntp/ 
73
 See, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of 
Patentability, 87 Texas L. Rev. 503, 570 n.243 (2009) (―If a drug only has one active 
ingredient and that ingredient is patented, then the patent will be difficult for generics to 
design around even if it is narrow since any change the generic firms make to the active 
ingredient would likely trigger the FDA's clinical-trial requirements.‖). 
74
 Id. Some very small particular changes might not require a completely new 
regulatory package.  For instance, if a very narrow patent were asserted against a brand-
name drug, the brand-name company could potentially make small alterations sufficient to 
avoid infringing the patent and then apply for approval using an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application as a generic version of the brand-name drug.  But even in this case, production 
or sale of the original drug would still be blocked by the patent; the replacement process 
would merely be somewhat easier.  
75
 See W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, B.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2311682, 25–31. 
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Modern patent monetization is an entirely different ballgame. Much 
of monetization operates effectively from leverage available through the 
costs and risks of patent litigation. In some cases, that leverage is achieved 
by the simple costs of challenging the license. With patent cases costing $1 
million to $6 million dollars,
76
 it may be cheaper for a company to settle 
against a determined monetizer. That leverage is magnified when patents 
are grouped together. A company that is tempted to fight off one patent may 
not have the stomach, or the litigation budget, to fight off 150 patents. In 
larger groupings, the validity of each individual patent become less 
important, and effective strategies can include a group of questionable 
patents—or patents that may not truly apply in this case—with one or two 
higher value patents thrown in. 
Multiplicity has another benefit for increasing leverage. Under 
current rules and practices, patent holders do not need to articulate the basis 
for their assertion that a target is infringing their patent. They do not need to 
even identify which claim in the patent is being infringed, in their view, or 
which aspect of product infringes.
77
 As a result, the burden of investigating 
a patent demand falls entirely on the company receiving the demand, while 
the monetizer can spend very little. When a company is faced with a claim 
that they are infringing 50 patents from a monetizer with a reputation for 
tough tactics and determination, a rational company may choose to settle, 
rather than engage in the considerable expense of even studying those 
patents in the first place.  
The same lack of specificity exists for patent lawsuits, as well as 
patent demands. In most federal cases, heightened pleading standards now 
require a certain level of specificity when filing a complaint. These 
standards were imposed by two Supreme Court cases, Twombly and Iqbal, 
which are sometime colloquially referred to as ―Twiqbal.”78 Federal Circuit 
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 Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations 
and Investors, supra note 19 at 63; Tom Ewing, Practical Considerations in the Indirect 
Deployment of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations and Investors, supra note 119, 
131; see also American Intellectual Property Association, 2011 Report of the Economic 
Survey (2011) (For a patent infringement claim that could be worth less than a $1 million, 
median legal costs are $650,000.  When $1 million to $25 million is considered at risk, 
total litigation costs can hit $2.5 million.  For a claim over $25 million, median legal costs 
are $5 million.). 
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 See Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform 2013: Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2013, 
PatentlyO (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/11/patent-reform-2013-
demand-letter-transparency-act-of-2013.html; Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2013, 
H.R. 3540, 113th Cong. (2013) (requiring, inter alia, that patent infringement demand 
letters identify each patent and each claim asserted, each allegedly infringing 
instrumentality by name and model number, and whether each instrumentality infringes 
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents). 
78
 See Dennis Crouch, Pleading Requirements: Patent Reform through the Supreme 
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case law, however, has ruled that these cases and their heightened pleading 
standards do not apply to patent lawsuits, which can be filed according to 
bare bones pleading forms established in 1934. Thus, patent holders can 
proceed to discovery with very little on the table. 
Not all monetizers are interested in the leverage of multiplicity. One 
scholar refers to ―lottery-ticket trolls,‖ who are looking for one patent that 
can strike fear into the hearts of an entire industry.
79
 Even in those cases, 
however, leverage plays an important role. Given difficulties in the 
doctrines related to calculating patent damages, a patent that makes a small 
contribution to the overall product can yield a payoff well beyond its 
proportionate value to the eventual product.
80
  
In addition to damages, injunctions are still a real threat. A company 
could find itself completely enjoined from making or selling its product, a 
potential disaster if the product at issue holds the company‘s profitability. 
At one point, injunctions were routinely granted under Federal Circuit 
precedent upon any successful infringement claim. The Supreme Court 
changed this practice in the case of eBay v. Mercexchange, ruling that 
courts in patent cases must apply the same 4-part test as in other injunction 
cases.
81
  Although the percentage of injunctions granted since eBay has 
declined, injunction is still a threat in the Federal Courts. In addition, the 
ITC has declined to apply the eBay principles to its cases.
82
 The threat of 
                                                                                                                            
Court and Judicial Conference, Patently-O (Feb. 11, 2014) (contrasting pleading standards 
for patent lawsuits with standards for other federal cases and using the term, ―Twiqbal‖), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/02/heightened-requirements-conference.html 
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 Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2126 (2013). 
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 See FELDMAN, supra note76, at 84-86 (describing problems in patent damages 
calculations). (―In particular, the details of determining the proper royalty rate and base of 
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Georgia Pacific test as more often involving the talents of a conjurer than those of a judge. 
This hypothetical, or some would say mythical, bargaining is intended to lead to a 
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Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, supra note 92, 2143 (―[F]or both legal and practical 
reasons damages in patent infringement suits . . . are not only somewhat unpredictable but, 
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 See eBay v. Mercexchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (detailing the four-part test as 
requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate, ―(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 
remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that considering 
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is 
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction‖). 
82
 Spansion, Inc. v. Int‘l Trade Comm‘n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(―[T]his court holds that eBay does not apply to Commission remedy determinations under 
Section 337.‖). 
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out-sized damages and a downright shutdown of the product creates enough 
leverage that companies may choose to settle, irrespective of the merits of 
the claim. Again, a determined monetizer with a strong reputation can 
create the leverage to make companies settle. 
The point is simply the following: the success of the modern 
monetization business method is not necessarily based on the value of the 
patent. That success is, in many ways, attributable to the leverage derived 
from the costs and risks of litigation. Biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
companies are not immune to the power of that leverage. In fact, those 
fields have additional leverage points. A company that is on the cusp of 
FDA approval for a drug--following a decade of developing the product and 
engaging in medical trials—may be particularly vulnerable to threats of 
patent litigation.  
 
3. The assumption of tightly clustered targets for monetizers 
 
The conventional wisdom suffers from a third weakness as well. It is 
based on the premise that patent trolls will only go after the best and most 
lucrative market. It is certainly true that technology provides better trolling 
grounds than biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. Smartphones, which may 
involve tens of thousands of patents, provide a much better target than a 
drug, whose key patent involves a single chemical composition. Even the 
classic unitary patent setting, however, will involve peripheral patents. The 
processes of experimentation, production, and distribution involve the use 
of numerous technologies, all of which could be vulnerable to patent claims. 
Again, imagining that one‘s product is safe because the core product is a 
chemical compound, ignores the potential for peripheral risk. 
Most important, the allure of patent monetization is drawing an 
increasing number of players onto the field, and generating an increasingly 
complex array of business models. The field is more crowded and 
traditional troll ―customers,‖ such as the technology companies who buy 
licenses from them, may reach the saturation point. In this context, markets 
that are merely good rather than spectacular, become appealing. Even if the 
market were not expanding, one could not rest assured that being a second 
best target means one is safe. One may simply be farther down on the list of 
potential customers.  
 Finally, the wolf appears to be at the doorstep—or at least the troll 
does. Although the modern version of monetization may have started 
largely in the technology sector, it has expanding to other sectors such as 
retail, and there are signs that monetization is headed for biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals. For example, press reports note that one of the largest 
aggregators holds patents for purifying nucleic acids in its portfolio, and 
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IPNav, a notorious patent monetization entity founded by Erich 
Spangenberg, describes its platform as ―equally effective for patents in all 
scientific and technology fields.‖83 Pharmaceutical company counsel are 
facing internal pressure to monetize IP assets which are not being used in 
marketed products.
84
  In addition, as noted above, patent brokers are 
beginning to hear from major pharmaceutical companies interested in 
shopping their noncore patents to monetizers, and studies of patent demands 
against startup companies show monetizers moving into the life science 
space.
85
 Most important, there are increasing signs that universities are 
transferring rights to monetizers.
86
  
 It is universities, of course, that are the focus of the study we have 
undertaken. Part of the narrative that biotechnology and pharmaceuticals are 
safe from patent trolling involves the relative lack of appropriate inventory.  
We should note, of course, that there are plenty of biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical patents outstanding. Nevertheless, while software patents 
may be easy to develop, a patent relevant to the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industry will be tougher to develop.  
We wondered, however, how university patents could potentially 
affect this calculus. This vast storehouse of patents sits largely unused in the 
form of extensive portfolios that are rarely licensed or commercialized in 
any form.  In fact, reports suggest that only 5% of the vast patent holdings 
of universities are subject to licensing.
87
 More recently, the Association of 
University Technology Managers is reexamining a 2007 pledge not to sell 
to monetizers, driven by financial considerations.
88
  Our suspicion was that 
these university holdings would provide a fertile hunting ground for 
monetizers. 
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PART III. A BRIEF SURVEY OF UNIVERSITY PATENT HOLDINGS 
 
As a proof of concept, we sought to identify a subset of university-
held patents potentially attractive to monetizers.
89
  This examination was 
not intended to be comprehensive; instead, we sought to see what would 
emerge from a relatively quick skim through university patent holdings 
performed by individuals with moderate knowledge but little experience 
and no sophisticated analytical tools.  If, as we suspected, patents of 
potential interest to monetizers targeting the biopharmaceutical industry 
were relatively common, we would expect them to appear during our 
search.
90
  Our suspicions were borne out—we found many patents that 
could potentially provide the basis for a suit by monetizers against the 
biopharmaceutical industry, or at least bargaining leverage. 
A.  Approach and methods 
 
We skimmed the patent holdings for four of the of five university 
systems with the highest number of patents issued in fiscal year 2011: the 
University of California system, the University of Texas system, MIT, and 
CalTech.
91
  We added as a wild-card the University of South Florida, the 
school among the top 10 in 2011 patent grants which had the lowest ratio of 
license revenues to research expenditures.  We searched for patents 
assigned to those universities. 
It is important to emphasize the deliberate limitations of this search.  
The search was performed by one author and one research assistant, each 
with a significant scientific background but no extensive experience in 
intellectual property litigation or patent prosecution.  We spent under 30 
total hours identifying potential target patents, briefly skimming the patent 
claims, and occasionally looking to other readily available Internet sources 
to see whether the patent might be of use to a monetizer.  Rather than 
attempting to devise sophisticated methodologies based on the search 
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 A large-scale empirical analysis of university-held patents potentially of interest to 
monetizer‘s might provide useful results.  However, such a study is far outside the 
parameters of this project.  
90
 Note that this search could provide support for our hypothesis only asymmetrically; 
the absence of monetizer-worthy patents in our relatively unsophisticated search would not 
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 Sortable Table: Universities With the Most Licensing Revenue, FY 2011, THE 
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Aug. 30, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/Sortable-
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Fund (WARF) was also among the top 4 research institutions by number 2011 patents 
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university research system and has a long history of actively seeking to commercialize 
university research. Id. 
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strategies of extant monetizers,
92
 we simply looked for patents assigned to 
the selected universities in what seemed to be relevant subject classes, such 
as drugs, chemical reactions, and methods of manufacture, and selected 
those patents whose titles seemed promising.
93
    We also deliberately did 
not try to identify available patents which clearly covered a current 
commercial product, as this fell too close to our concern of providing a 
precise roadmap for monetizers.
94
 
We also spent approximately 8 hours trying a sample more targeted 
search.  One broad form of patent covers chemical classes by claiming them 
using ―Markush‖ claim language,95 which typically include chemical 
compositions with a base structure and one or more variable elements, to be 
filled from a list of possibilities included in the claim language.  We 
searched for Markush claims assigned to the universities listed above.
96
  
Many had already been noted in the broad initial skim, but some additional 
composition-directed patents appeared which had been missed earlier.  This 
quick but targeted search yielded an additional 22 targets. 
The patents identified in this fashion were then read to determine 
whether they could plausibly be used as the basis for suit or negotiation by a 
biopharmaceutical-targeting monetizer.  Because the vast majority of suits 
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 See also IPNav, Best Practices in Patent Monetization 2-3 (June 2012), 
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parte Markush, 1925 Dec. Comm‘r Pat. 126 (1924)). See also Abbott Labs. v. Baxter 
Pharm. Prods., Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 1280-81 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Harnisch, 631 F.2d 
716, 716-17 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
96
 Specifically, we searched the USPTO Full Text Database for claims (―ACLM/‖) 
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by monetizers do not depend on proceeding to actual validity or 
infringement determinations, we did not attempt to evaluate the patent‘s 
validity, and did not attempt careful claim construction.  We also did not 
attempt to identify specific industry targets likely to infringe the patents, for 
reasons both of resource limitations and of not wishing to provide too 
straightforward a target list for potential monetizers.  Finally, we did not—
and feasibly could not—determine the licensing situation of these patents.  
It is possible that some subset of the patents we have identified are in fact 
licensed by universities to the relevant potential infringers.  Given the 
secrecy of licensing arrangements, this is an unavoidable limitation a study 
of this kind; however, considering the broad range of industry and 
university players, we consider it unlikely that licensing of even potentially 
relevant patents is so widespread as to render all industry players safe from 
monetizers. 
 
B.  Results 
 
We found dozens of potentially assertable patents in several 
categories.  The parameters of our search mean there are almost certainly 
many more to be found by monetizers, who have more time and expertise in 
searching.  However, the patents we found in our non-intensive search 
support our hypothesis: the patent holdings of universities do indeed appear 
to hold many patents of potential interest to monetizers seeking to target the 
biopharmaceutical industry.  Potentially relevant patents cover drugs‘ active 
ingredients; methods of treatment; screening methods to identify new drugs; 
manufacturing methods; dosage forms; and plausibly related ancillary 
technologies (a catchment category including patents useful in a ―peddler‘s 
bag‖/―kitchen sink‖ approach but otherwise of relatively attenuated 
relationship to industry procedures).  This section describes each of the 
several types of patents we found, including an exemplar of each type. 
 
1. Active ingredient patents 
 
Every drug relies on active pharmaceutical ingredients, and patents 
covering those active pharmaceutical ingredients are clearly the dominant 
form of patent in the biopharmaceutical industry.  When policy or 
scholarship discusses ―drug patents‖ without further elaboration, this type 
of patent is meant.  Such patents are particularly strong due to the FDA 
approval process, as described above; essentially, they cannot be invented 
around.  Because active pharmaceutical ingredient patents are central to the 
patent strategy of drug companies, such patents covering marketed drugs 
would be of tremendous use to monetizers, especially of the ―lottery-ticket 
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troll‖ variety.  They could be potent litigation weapons both before and after 
approval, and would provide powerful bargaining tools. 
These patents are also the least likely to be found.  Typically, the 
PTO will not grant multiple patents covering a single chemical, since once 
the chemical is disclosed in a patent, the second patent would be barred for 
lack of novelty.  That said, there is a substantial amount of error at the PTO, 
and initial examination involves few resources.
97
 Drug companies also do 
particularly extensive diligence seeking patents that cover potential active 
pharmaceutical ingredients, since the patentability of a drug‘s active 
pharmaceutical ingredient is a key question in approving the drug‘s 
development.
98
  However, some patents are likely to slip past these efforts 
as well, particularly in light of the broad combinatorial nature of Markush 
claims for chemical classes.
99
 
Although our search found relatively few composition patents which 
appear to cover active pharmaceutical ingredients for a class of 
commercially viable or currently marketed drugs, we did find some.
100
  For 
example, Patent no. 6,437,105, filed November 2, 1999 and assigned to the 
University of Texas System, covers a large set of anthracycline-based 
antitumor agents.
101
  Anthracyclines are a widely used class of powerful 
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 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495 
(2001). 
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 See, e.g., Benjamin Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standard of Patentability, 87 
TEX. L. REV. 503, 512–13 (2009). 
99
 See note 95, supra. 
100
 As described above, we did not attempt to find or demonstrate specific instances of 
infringement.   
101
 The patent‘s only independent claim, Claim 1, claims: 
A substituted anthracycline having the formula: 
 
wherein 
R
1
 is a hydroxyl group (—OH), a methoxy group (—OCH3), an alkoxy group 
having 1-20 carbon atoms, an alkyl group having 1-20 carbon atoms, an aryl 
group having 6-20 carbon atoms, a fatty acyl group having the structure —O—
CO(CH2)nCH3, wherein n=an integer from 1 to about 20, or a fatty acyl group 
having the structure —O—CO(CH2)l(CH═CH)m(CH2)nCH3, wherein l is an 
integer between 1 to 3, m is an integer between 1 and about 6, and n is an integer 
between 1 to about 9; 
each of R
2
 and R
3
 is, independently of the other, a hydrogen (—H) group, a 
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chemotherapy drugs used to treat several cancers, including lymphomas, 
leukemias, and cancers of the breast, uterus, and lung.
102
  They include 
doxorubicin (Adriamycin) and daunorubicin (Daunomycin).
103
  Other 
patents we found in this category covered a broad range of analogs to the 
natural antimicrobial agent indolicidin
104
 and a range of C-substituted 
diindolylmethane compounds; the latter are used to treat a respiratory 
disease and to prevent certain cancers.
105
 
 
2. Methods of treatment 
 
Another relevant patent type covers methods of treatment—that is, 
the use of a drug by a doctor, patient, or anyone else to treat a disease.  For 
instance, Pfizer holds a patent covering the use of its blockbuster drug 
Lipitor to treat high cholesterol, as well as covering the active 
                                                                                                                            
hydroxyl group (—OH), a methoxy group (—OCH3) or a double bonded oxygen 
moiety; 
R
4
 is a hydrogen (—H) group, a hydroxyl group (—OH), a methoxy group 
(—OCH3) or a halide; 
each of Y
1
 and Y
2
 is, independently of the other, a hydrogen (—H) group; a 
hydroxyl group (—OH); a methoxy group (—OCH3); or a double bonded oxygen, 
sulphur, or nitrogen group; 
R
5
-R
12
 are, independently, —H, —OH, a halide, —OR13, —SH, —SR13, —
NH2, —NHR
13
, —N(R13)2; R
5
-R
12
 can additionally independently be a saccharide; 
or R
9
 can additionally be CH3, with the proviso that: 
both of R
6
 and R
7
 or both of R
5
 and R
8 
or both of R
5
 and R
11
 or both of R
6
 and 
R
12
 are involved in forming a three ring structure; wherein said three ring structure 
contains three heteroatoms selected from the group consisting of O and N and the 
rings of said three ring structure have 5 or 6 members; or 
either of R
5
 and R
6
 is independently a mercapto-haloalkyl group; an ether 
alkyl group containing an easy leaving group; an alkyl group containing an easy 
leaving group or an ether alkyl group containing an aziridine, oxirane, thiirane, 
oxetane or thietane ring; and 
R
13
 is a methyl group, an alkoxy group having 1-20 carbon atoms, an alkyl 
group having 1-20 carbon atoms, an aryl group having 6-20 carbon atoms, a fatty 
acyl group having the structure —CO(CH2)nCH3, wherein n=an integer from 1 to 
about 20, or a fatty acyl group having the structure —
CO(CH2)l(CH═CH)m(CH2)nCH3, wherein l is an integer between 1 to 3, m is an 
integer between 1 and about 6, and n is an integer between 1 to about 9. 
102
 Giorgio Minotti et al., Anthracyclines: Molecular Advances and Pharmacologic 
Developments in Antitumor Activity and Cardiotoxicity, 56 PHARMACOL. REV. 185 (2004) 
103
 Note that, although we did not perform a full infringement analysis, it is unlikely 
that doxorubicin or daunorubicin themselves actually infringe the ‗105 patent, which 
discloses a 3-ring structure not present in either of those drugs. 
104
 Patent No. 6,524,585, filed October 12, 1999 and assigned to the University of 
California. 
105
 B.J. Wiatrak, Overview of current respiratory papillomatosis, 11 CURRENT OPS. IN 
OTOLARYNGOLOGY, HEAD, AND NECK SURGERY 433 (2003). 
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pharmaceutical ingredient of Lipitor itself.
106
  New uses of an already 
marketed drug can also be patented, like the use of minoxidil (Rogaine) to 
treat male pattern baldness, discovered years after its initial development as 
a treatment for high blood pressure.
107
   
This type of method of treatment claim could be asserted by 
monetizers against the industry. For instance, consider a counterfactual 
story in which the use of minoxidil in treating baldness was discovered not 
by Upjohn, the drug‘s maker, but by MIT researchers, who published the 
results and simultaneously applied for a patent.  Doctors relying on the 
study could prescribe minoxidil to treat baldness, and Upjohn could share 
the study in an effort to increase sales.
108
  Once the patent issued, however, 
use of the drug to treat baldness would infringe the patent, even though 
Upjohn still held the patent on the drug itself and its original use in treating 
high blood pressure.  Therefore, a monetizer who bought the patent from 
MIT could sue Upjohn for contributory infringement, arguing that Upjohn 
was encouraging doctors and patients to infringe the patent.
109
   
A patent like this could be a ―lottery-ticket‖ patent, if it were able to 
completely block the only or most important treatment indication for a 
drug.
110
  More frequently, the monetizer could also assert this patent against 
the doctors prescribing minodixil for baldness, or even patients using it.  
This type of plausible nuisance suit could quickly garner high returns, since 
tens of thousands of doctors would be potential targets for demand letters, 
and settlements or licensing fees in the low thousands of dollars would be 
                                                 
106
 U.S. Pat. No. 4,681,893 (filed May 30, 1986).  Claims 1–7 claim various active 
pharmaceutical ingredient variants; Claim 8 claims a drug containing an active 
pharmaceutical ingredient (such as Lipitor), and Claim 9 claims ―[a] method of inhibiting 
cholesterol biosynthesis in a patient in need of such treatment by administering [such a 
drug].‖ 
107
 The initial patent on minoxidil, U.S. Pat. No. 3,461,461 (filed Aug. 12, 1969) 
covered the compound itself and a method of using it to treat high blood pressure.  Using 
minoxidil to treat baldness was claimed in a later patent, U.S. Pat. No. 4,139,619 (filed 
Feb. 13, 1979). 
108
 United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that a 
complete and criminal ban on off-label promotion by pharmaceutical manufacturers fails 
the commercial free speech inquiry and is unconstitutional). 
109
 Inducing infringement of a patent creates liability for infringement under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(b). 
110
 If a drug company is not directly advertising a new use covered by a patent, it 
would likely be more challenging to win a suit for induced infringement against the drug 
company itself.  This lack of advertising would be quite likely if the company did not hold 
the new use patent; the company would be unlikely to seek FDA approval for the new use, 
and promoting unapproved uses is prohibited by the FDA.  On the other side of this 
dynamic, it is challenging for companies to enforce new use patents even if they do hold 
them, since they do not have information about the purposes for which doctors prescribe 
drugs to any individual patient. 
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far less than the cost of defending against a patent suit.
111
 These nuisance 
suits would be problematic and expensive for doctors and could create 
tremendous leverage against drug companies to license the relevant patents.  
While once the thought of monetizers targeting small-scale users was 
considered very unlikely,
112
 such tactics have recently become much more 
common, as described above.
113
   
One example of such a broad method of treatment patent we found 
could potentially implicate postmenopausal hormone replacement therapy 
(HRT).
114
  Patent no. 6,692,763, filed July 11, 2000 and assigned to the 
University of California system, disclosed ―methods for treatment of 
postmenopausal women using ultra-low doses of estrogen.‖  The broad 
independent claim covers administration of estrogen to postmenopausal 
women in very low doses.
115
  Although HRT most frequently uses higher 
dosage levels,
 116
 this patent could plausibly be asserted against industry and 
                                                 
111
 This cost disparity also decreases the challenge that patent-holders—whether drug 
companies or monetizers—cannot easily tell for what purpose a doctor is prescribing a 
drug; successfully defending against a nuisance suit is still far more expensive than a 
typical settlement or licensing fee for small targets.  
112
 Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation (June 
2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf 
(indicating recent increase in targeting smaller entities, as compared to the past: ―PAE 
activities hurt firms of all sizes. Although many significant settlements are from large 
companies, the majority of PAE suits target small and inventor-driven companies. In 
addition, PAEs are increasingly targeting end users of products, include many small 
businesses.‖). 
113
 See supra pt. I at 8. 
114
 Although HRT has been the subject of some controversy regarding its preventative 
effects, it is still in wide use.  See generally Debora Kotz, Hormone replacement therapy 
supported for some, Boston Globe (Oct. 2, 2013), available at 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/10/01/hormone-replacement-therapy-less-
risky-for-women-their-latest-data-suggest/pqdVCCO4i4EXP4shXBODsI/story.html (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2013) 
115
 Claim 1 claims: 
A method for treating a physical condition resulting from estrogen decline in 
a postmenopausal subject, said method comprising administering to said subject 
an amount of estrogen which is effective to produce a resulting serum level of said 
estrogen in said subject that is equivalent to a serum estadiol [sic] level not 
exceeding of between about 5 pg/ml and about 15 pg/ml [note – for 
postmenopausal women, the level typically ranges from 0 to 35 pg/ml], wherein: 
the estrogen is administered orally, parenterally, or transdermally; 
said physical condition is selected from the group consisting of 
osteoporosis, headaches, nausea, depression, hot flashes, decrease in 
bone mineral density, and increased risk or incidence of bone fracture; 
and 
the resulting serum level of the estrogen is responsive to the 
administering of the estrogen. 
116
 See Rice VM, Optimizing the Dose of Hormone Replacement Therapy, 47(5) INT‘L 
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practitioner targets. 
 
3. Manufacturing methods 
 
In addition to central patents covering active pharmaceutical 
ingredients and methods of treatment, other patents cover more peripheral 
activities.  For instance, patents can cover methods used to manufacture 
drugs.  Such a patent could block the manufacture of a drug if it covered a 
central process, or could less powerfully force a firm to shift its methods, 
which is itself costly.
117
   
We found several potentially assertable patents covering 
manufacturing methods.  As one of us has previously noted, determining 
actual infringement of manufacturing methods patents is challenging due to 
the secrecy of pharmaceutical manufacturing.
118
 This makes assertion of 
such patents less likely to successfully support a ―lottery-ticket‖ strategy.  
However, that would not prevent the assertion of these patents in a 
―peddler‘s bag‖ or ―assault rifle‖ strategy , especially for manufacturing 
method patents which are relatively common or which form a small but 
useful part of typical manufacturing procedures. 
For instance, Patent no. 6,890,740, filed February 12, 2001 and 
assigned to the University of California, claims a method of separating 
different-sized biological materials.
119
  The patent broadly covers separating 
                                                                                                                            
J. OF FERTILITY AND WOMEN‘S MED. 205–10 (2002) (―[M]ore commonly prescribed doses‖ 
ranges include 0.625 mg of CEE or 0.5 mg 17beta-estradiol.). 
117
 See W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2311682, 25–31.  Although 
determining potential infringement is challenging because manufacturing processes are 
typically kept secret, see id. at 35–35, once an infringement suit is brought demonstrating 
infringement is made somewhat easier by a statutory presumption of infringement on a 
showing ―(1) that a substantial likelihood exists that the product was made by the patented 
process, and (2) that the plaintiff has made a reasonable effort to determine the process 
actually used in the production of the product and was unable to so determine.‖  Id. (citing 
35 U.S.C. § 295).  This presumption exists to counter the typical secrecy accorded 
manufacturing methods.  Id. While the initial stage of identifying potential infringement 
may deter most suits by pharmaceutical companies, who have incentives to avoid bringing 
frivolous or losing suits against repeat-player competitors, monetizers may lack those 
incentives and are demonstrably much more willing to bring ―fishing expedition‖ suits. 
118
 See id. at 34–36. 
119
 Claim 1 claims: 
A method for separating different sized biological materials to increase 
throughput of sampling, comprising the following steps in the order named: 
a. centrifuging said biological materials in a container; 
b. inserting a separation barrier into said container to separate 
biological materials with a size small enough to pass through said 
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biological materials of different sizes by centrifuging the materials in a 
container with a size-specific sieve so smaller materials pass through and 
larger materials do not.
120
  Such a method is broadly useful in the 
manufacture of biologics,
121
 and might plausibly be alleged to be infringed 
in many manufacturing processes, even if the monetizer has little or no 
direct knowledge. 
 
4. Dosage forms 
 
Patents can also cover the specific dosage form of a drug.  Dosage 
form describes the physical form of the drug taken by a patient—that is, a 
tablet, capsule, solution, or some other format.  A patent which could be 
used to block a particular dosage form could provide a significant weapon 
to monetizers; while it would not block all uses of a drug, it could block the 
dominant format of a single drug and could also potentially impact multiple 
drugs made by a single firm. 
While many traditional dosage forms, such as a basic coated tablet, a 
capsule, or a solution, are unlikely to be patentable, other more recent forms 
may be.  For example, Patent no. 7,300,668, filed October 29, 2002 and 
assigned to MIT, covers a three-dimensionally printed controlled-release 
dosage form.
122
  The patent claims a printed dosage form made up of 
                                                                                                                            
separation barrier from biological materials with a size too large to pass 
through said separation barrier; 
c. withdrawing a portion of said biological materials from only one 
side of said separation barrier. 
120
 Claim 1 covers: 
A method for separating different sized biological materials to increase 
throughput of sampling, comprising the following steps in the order named: 
a. centrifuging said biological materials in a container; 
b. inserting a separation barrier into said container to separate 
biological materials with a size small enough to pass through said 
separation barrier from biological materials with a size too large to pass 
through said separation barrier; 
c. withdrawing a portion of said biological materials from only one 
side of said separation barrier. 
121
 Biologics are large-molecule drugs made by living systems rather than chemical 
synthesis.  They include proteins, vaccines, and antibodies, and make up a large and 
growing fraction of blockbuster drugs.  See Jordan Paradise, Follow-On Biologics: 
Implementation Challenges and Opportunities: Foreword, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 501, 
502 (2011). 
122
 Claim 1 covers: 
A dosage form comprising: 
a three-dimensionally printed innermost region comprising a first 
regional concentration of at least one Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient; 
and 
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multiple layers, each layer with a different concentration of the active 
ingredient.  Without the three-dimensional printing limitation, that format 
describes many current extended-release dosage forms, and a broad 
construction of the term ―three-dimensionally printed‖ is at least plausible. 
 
5. Screening methods 
 
Patents can also cover the processes that companies use to find new 
drugs, particularly ways to screen large sets of possible drugs to find the 
ones which are likely to be medically useful.  We found several such 
patents in our search.  While monetizers asserting these patents are less 
likely able to exploit the leverage provided by regulatory hurdles described 
above,
123
 it may still challenge significant research and development 
activity by drug companies.  Such patents would be particularly amenable 
to ―peddler‘s bag‖ or ―assault rifle‖ approaches. 
One example is Patent no. 6,274,321, filed December 3, 1999 and 
assigned to the University of California system, covering a very general 
method of screening nucleic acids (including DNA, cDNA, and RNA) to 
find which nucleic acids express products of medical interest.
124
  Such 
                                                                                                                            
plural three-dimensionally printed non-innermost regions in nested 
arrangement and comprising: 
a) one or more nested internal regions each comprising a 
respective regional concentration of at least one Active 
Pharmaceutical Ingredient, wherein an internal region 
completely surrounds and is in contact with the innermost 
regions, and any other internal region present completely 
surrounds another internal region located to the interior thereof; 
and 
b) an outermost region completely surrounding an internal 
region and comprising a respective regional concentration of at 
least one Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient, 
wherein the internal and outermost regions are in nested 
arrangement, the regional concentration of Active Pharmaceutical 
Ingredient in a region is different from the regional concentration of 
Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient in another region adjacent to it, the 
regional concentration of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient in an internal 
region is non-zero, the regional concentration of Active Pharmaceutical 
Ingredient in plural regions is non-zero, and the respective regional 
concentrations are selected so that the at least one Active Pharmaceutical 
Ingredient is released in approximately a zero-order release. 
123
 See supra at 22. 
124
 Claim 1 of the patent claims: 
A method of identifying a nucleic acid in a pool of interest, comprising the 
steps of: 
(1) obtaining a plurality of nucleic acids, wherein the nucleic acids 
are individually identifiable; 
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screening is a basic research step in many forms of pharmaceutical research, 
especially in developing new biologics.
125
  Thus, such a patent could 
potentially be asserted against the research activities of many different 
firms. 
 
6. Plausibly related patents 
 
Finally, among the significant number of patents we found in the 
preceding categories which appear to have at least the possibility of 
meritorious assertion, we found many patents which would at least pass the 
risibility test—at least potentially enforced by the possibility of Rule 11 
sanctions for frivolous suits—and which could therefore be useful to add 
bulk to a ―peddler‘s bag‖ approach or in any approach relying primarily on 
the high costs of patent litigation to extract relatively small settlements.  For 
instance, we found patents on isotopically labeled DNA,
126
 a method for 
treatment of retinal diseases,
127
 fluorescent protein sensors for detection of 
analytes,
128
 combinatorial synthesis of inorganic composite materials,
129
 and 
catalytic reactions involving alkenes.
130
  While it is possible that any of 
these might more accurately be placed in one of the prior categories, they 
did not appear to our initial examination as likely to form the basis for a 
stronger patent suit.  However, each could potentially be used as part of a 
broader set of asserted patents to increase potential litigation costs and 
                                                                                                                            
(2) pooling the nucleic acids in step (1) into at least two pools of at 
least one nucleic acid each; 
(3) expressing the nucleic acid pools in step (2) to obtain 
corresponding protein expression product pools; 
(4) assaying the expression product pools in step (3) for products 
having an interaction with a target molecule; 
(5) selecting a nucleic acid pool corresponding to an expression 
product pool identified in step (4); and 
(6) identifying at least one individual nucleic acid in the nucleic acid 
pool identified in step (5).      
125
 Paul H. Johnson, et al., Mutliplex Gene Expression Analysis for High-Throughput 
Drug Discovery: Screening and Analysis of Compounds Affecting Genes Overexpressed in 
Cancer Cells, 1 MOLECULAR CANCER THERAPEUTICS 1293 (2002). 
126
 U.S. Pat. No. 7,022,834 (filed September 16, 2004) (assigned to The Regents of the 
University of California). 
127
 U.S. Pat. No. 6,066,675 (filed September 8, 1997) (assigned to The Regents of the 
University of California).  
128
 U.S. Pat. No. 6,197,928 (filed March 14, 1997) (assigned to The Regents of the 
University of California). 
129
 U.S. Pat. No. 7,767,627 (April 22, 1997) (assigned to The Regents of the University 
of California). 
130
 U.S. Pat. No. 8,314,246 (filed August 30, 2006) (assigned to Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology). 
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consequently provide additional leverage in settlement negotiations. 
 
7. Overall search conclusions 
 
Our search confirmed our initial suspicions that university patent 
holdings are likely to provide fertile hunting grounds for monetizers.  In a 
relatively short period of time, two researchers with only basic expertise 
were able to find dozens of potentially monetizable patents within the 
holdings of just five major universities.  Undoubtedly the holdings of those 
universities include many more patents potentially assertable against 
players in the biopharmaceutical industry.  And, of course, those are only 
five universities—there are many more schools with extensive holdings 
potentially available.   
The ease with which we found potentially relevant patents inevitably 
raises the question: if these patents are around and threatening, why hasn‘t 
the biopharmaceutical industry found and dealt with them?  One possibility, 
of course, is that the industry has found most or all commercially relevant 
patents, and that such patents have been evaluated by the relevant potential 
targets and either found unproblematic or licensed.  Given the lack of 
discussion of ancillary patents or monetizers in the pharmaceutical industry 
generally, and the challenges of conducting a comprehensive search as 
opposed to our quick look, we think this outcome unlikely.  It seems more 
likely that the conventional wisdom above—few relevant patents, a limited 
set of monetizer targets, and higher barriers to commercial entry—has 
helped to keep these potential patent threats off the radar of the industry. 
A second possibility is simply that up until now, the patent holdings 
of major universities has posed little threat, particularly those peripheral 
patents that could be used for the type of bargaining leverage popularized in 
modern patent trolling, and have thus been too remote to consider. 
Universities traditionally have not engaged in widespread patent litigation. 
For example, an extensive academic study of all 13,000 patent lawsuits filed 
in 4 recent years showed that universities have served as the first named 
plaintiff in less than one-half of one percent of the lawsuits filed.
131
 Given 
that universities have not engaged in extensive litigation themselves, and 
have had a stated policy of not transferring to patent assertion entities, the 
threat of university holdings may have been to low to justify the costs of 
searching out and licensing every patent that could potentially be launched 
against a product. This would be particularly true, given the trolling tactics 
of extracting settlements related to the economics of litigation, rather than 
the value of the patent itself. Without a clear threat of that kind, the costs of 
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 See Feldman, Ewing & Jeruss, supra note 16. 
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clearing the field of anything that could be waved at a biopharmaceutical 
company would be wasteful, if not prohibitive.  
In short, modern patent trolling in the technology industry did not 
require the invention of new inputs. The basic raw materials existed, 
including broadly worded patents, a large inventory of unused patents and 
patent claims, and an imbalance of litigation costs. The catalyst for modern 
patent trolling in the technology industry was simply brilliant minds 
calculating how to take advantage of these elements on a large-scale and 
sophisticated manner, with many others following suit. 
Although early anecdotal evidence suggests that patent trolling is 
moving into biopharmaceuticals, conventional wisdom has always held that 
the raw materials do not exist in that space. This study, however, 
demonstrates that the conventional wisdom is wrong. Where behavior is 
structurally predictable, opportunities exist to allow planning for and 
protecting against abuses in that behavior. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the ongoing policy and scholarly debates about patent trolls, by 
far the most prominent focus has been on the software and high technology 
industries.  Conventional wisdom has assumed that the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industries have little to fear from trolls, and at least partly 
because of that assumption, those industries have either opposed or skirted 
many reform efforts in both the past and present. 
In this piece, we have argued that, on both theoretical and empirical 
levels, patent monetizers are able and likely to spread beyond their 
traditional targets and that the bio and pharmaceutical industries are 
vulnerable to monetization tactics.  Theoretically, the newly diverse 
strategies of monetizers broaden potential targets, and in the drug industry, 
regulatory constraints may make patent holdups particularly costly.  
Empirically, our deliberately brief and cursory survey of university patent 
holdings reveals that many patents are potentially available for licensing to 
monetizers, and universities are becoming more amenable to such 
licensing.
132
  More broadly, potentially assertable patents are likely to be 
found not only in the holdings of universities, but in the portfolios of 
biotech and pharmaceutical companies, large and small, which may well be 
willing to license patents to the detriment of their competitors as has 
happened in the high tech sector.  It is not inevitable that monetizers will 
descend on the bio and pharmaceutical industries, but in our opinion it is a 
serious threat.  Potentially policy solutions to the problems raised by 
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 See Basken, supra note 88. 
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monetizers should take this possibility into account. 
 
